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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

1
Plaintiff'Respondent,

vs.
ROMEO ALDO BEORCHIA,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No
13729

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF CASE
On the 17th day of January 1974, Federal and State
Agents entered the premises at 155 East 3rd North,
Logan, Utah, finding therein among others, Appellant,
Romeo Aldo Beorchia. In the process of arresting another individual, certain fire arms were located on the
premises and the Appellant was arrested under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 76-10-503 in that the
Appellant was alleged to have possessed a dangerous
weapon while not a citizen of the United States. The
Appellant made certain Motions to the Court, specifically
that the Statute under which the Appellant was charged
was unconstitutional and the Appellant further objected
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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to the Jury array, arguing that selection of Jury was limited by an unconstitutional standard. The Court took the
objections under advisement and a Jury Trial was had
and at the close of the State's evidence the Appellant
moved for a Dismissal on the ground that the State had
failed to prove that there was possession in the Appellant
as a matter of law. The Court took that Motion under
advisement as well and the Appellant put on his case
and as the close of the evidence the Jury returned a verdict of guilty. In a subsequent hearing the Court denied
the Motions of the Appellant and sentenced him to 0 to
5 years in the State Penitentiary from which sentence the
Appellant appealed.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Appellant was tried and convicted of Possession
of a Dangerous weapon while not a citizen of the United
States in the District Court in and for Cache County,
before the Honorable VeNoy Christensen.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the decision of the lower
court.
POINTS ON APPEAL
POINT I.
WHETHER OR NOT UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 78-46-8 CONFORMS WITH 14TH
AMENDMENT STANDARDS AS TO EQUAL
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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PROTECTION AND TO 5TH AMENDMENT
STANDARDS OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES IN THAT THE JURY
ARRAY WAS NOT PROPERLY CONSTITUTED.
POINT II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLANT
WAS ENTITLED TO A DISMISSAL AT
THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S EVIDENCE
IN THAT THE STATE DID NOT SHOW
POSSESSION WAS IN THE APPELLANT
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
POINT III.
WHETHER OR NOT UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 76-10-503 VIOLATED APPELLANT'S
RIGHTS UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES UNDER THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE OF THAT AMENDMENT.
POINT IV.
WHETHER OR NOT UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 76-10-503 AS APPLIED TO THE APPELLANT, IS VIOLATIVE OF APPELLANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT V.
THE LAWS REGULATING ALIENS HAVING BEEN PREEMPTED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ARE THE SOLE AND
SEPARATE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES AND U. C. A. 7610-503 AMOUNTS TO AN INTERFERENCE
IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
WHETHER OR NOT UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 78-46-8 CONFORMS WITH 14TH
AMENDMENT STANDARDS AS TO EQUAL
PROTECTION AND TO 5TH AMENDMENT
STANDARDS OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES IN THAT THE JURY
ARRAY WAS NOT PROPERLY CONSTITUTED.
While it is true that the common law principal that
a Defendant was entitled to a "Judgment of his peers"
referred to in the Magna Carta tihis principle is not
necessarily still the proper criteria for jury selection, see
Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, P. 85, 86 L. Ed.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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680, P. 707, 62 S. Ct. 457 (1942). In the Gktsser case the
Court said that the proper functioning of the Jury system, and indeed, of democracy itself, requires that a
Jury be "a body truly representative of the community
and not an organ of any special group or class". It is
not the Appellant's position that he was necessarily entitled to have an alien or aliens sit on his jury but rather
that be was entitled to a constitutional jury under the
standard laid down in the Glasser case. Under Utah Code
Annotated 78-46-8, applicable portions are:
78-46-8. WHO IS COMPETENT TO SERVE.
A person shall be competent to sit as a Juror:
(1) Who is a citizen of the United States over
tiie age of twenty-one years;
(2) Who can read and write the English language;
(3) Who resides in and has resided in the country for six months next preceding the time he
is selected; . . . required shall be residence in
the city or precinct for six months next preceding the time actually called to serve;
(4) Who is a taxpayer in the State, and,
(5) Who is of sound mind and discretion, and
not so disabled in body as to be unable to serve.
It can be seen that in no way does the Statute provide for a representative cross section of the community.
In fact, the very jury selection process in Cache County
precludes any possibility of getting a cross section of the
community because the jury is selected from the rolls
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of the registered voters which in itself would exclude
important classes of people, to-wit; people who do not
meet the residency requirement under voters registration
statutes and people under eighteen. But the Statute itself goes even farther than the selective process in excluding segments of the community. The Statute also
excludes people who do not pay taxes and excludes persons on the basis of citizenship, as well as the age and
residency bar which is actually imposed through the jury
selection system as practiced in Cache County. In the
Utah case of Reese, et al. v. Knott, at 24 P. 757, 3 U. 466,
the Utah Supreme Court held that a Utah Statute providing that only a taxpayer shall be eligible to sit on the
Jury is in violation of the United States Constitution
Article VII, which declares that "The right of trial by
jury shall be preserved." Although this a somewhat ancient case it has never been overruled and would appear
to be good law and would therefore be conclusive in favor
of Appellant's position in this case. We need not rely
exclusively on the Utah case, how€>ver, in the case of
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 20
L. Ed. 2d 491 (1968), the United States Supreme Court
held that in serious criminal cases the Defendant shall
have the right to trial by Jury. Implicit in the holding
of the Court, is the proposition that the Defendant shall
have the right to trial by a cxxnstitutional jury which, the
Appellant contends, was not the case here. It matters
not that the Appellant cannot show that there was damage resulting from the fact that the jury excluded certain
classes of persons. The Appellant could contend that the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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fact that aliens were precluded from serving on his jury
by action of the Statute worked to his detriment but he
need not go that far. In the case of Peters v. Kiff, 407
U. S. 493, 33 L. Ed. 2d 83, 92 S. O t 2163 (1972), the
United States Supreme Court held that, whatever his
race, a State criminal Defendant has standing to challenge the system used to select his grand or petit jury,
on the ground that it arbitrarily excludes from service
the members of any race and thereby denies him due
process of law. It not being necessary that Appellant
show actual harm or bias; as in Peters v. Kiff, supra,
where a white Defendant claimed that a practice whereby
negroes were systematically excluded from the jury service, particularly where congress had made such exclusion by public officials a crime, give the Appellant standing to invoke his claim. In the instant case we have the
same factual basis in that 42 U. S. Code § 1981, which
was originally enacted to protect the rights of negroes
also applies to aliens. In Roberto v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 111 Fed. 2d 811, Cert. Den., 339 U. S.
929 (1949), the Federal Circuit Court construed that
Statute in holding that:
"Although enacted primarily to insure equal
civil rights to negroes, it has been held that the
protection of this Section extends to Aliens as
well as citizens."
It would therefore seem that under the Federal Legislation not only of the 42 U. S. Code § 1981 cited above, but
also under 18 U. S. C. § 243, the Appellant would enjoy
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the same protection as if he were a minority race. Under
Utah Law as well as Federal Law all of the rights of the
Constitution are reserved to "The people" or "To all
persons" which would then necessarily include the Appellant although he is a citizen of Italy. See also Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664, in which
the Court held that:
"Prejudices often exist against particular classes
in the community, which sway the Judgment of
the Jurors, and which, therefore, operate in some
cases to deny persons of those classes the full
enjoyment of that protection which others enjoy."
Such is the case with aliens as so aptly observed in
Purdy and Fitzpatrick v. State, 456 P. 2d 645, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 77 (1969). The Court noted that the concept of
equal protection of the laws compels recognization of
the proposition that persons similarly situated with respect to the Legislative purpose of the law receive equal
treatment thereunder and then went on to say:
"Aliens . . . denied the right to vote, lack the
most basic means of defending themselves in
the political processes."
See also, Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545, 17 L. Ed. 2d
599, 87 S. Ct. 643 (1967), and other cases cited in the
Annotation accompanying Peters v. Kiff, at 33 L. Ed. 2d
783, P. 791. Another recent United States Supreme Court
case, In Re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 37 L. Ed. 2d 910, 93
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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S. Ct. 2851 (1973), the United States Supreme Court
held that a Citizenship may not be prescribed by a state
as a requirement for practice of law. The Courts recognized that the fact that a person is an alien does not
necessarily mean that he would be unqualified as a practitioner of law and by analogy the fact that a person is
not a citizen or that a person is not a taxpayer would
not preclude him from sitting on a jury. It is true that
the cases hold that the State has no requirement to include aliens in its democratic political institutions and
that the right to vote and the right to hold high public
office is not necessarily violative of an alien's rights. See
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, 37 L. Ed. 2d 853,
93 S. Ot. 2842 (1973), but these cases are not controlling as this issue is presented.
POINT II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLANT
WAS ENTITLED TO A DISMISSAL AT
THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S EVIDENCE
IN THAT THE STATE DID NOT SHOW
POSSESSION WAS IN THE APPELLANT
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Appellant submits that under the instructions given
to the Jury and based on the record at trial, the Appellant was not in possession of the fire arms as a matter
of law and the verdict was therefore not supported by
the evidence.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT III.
WHETHER OR NOT UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 76-10-503 VIOLATED APPELLANT'S
RIGHTS UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES UNDER THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE OF THAT AMENDMENT.
The Appellant does not feel that this is a second
Amendment issue under the United States Constitution
for the purpose of this argument. The State can cite
many cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States, most of great antiquity, which hold that the
restrictions upon the control of guns in the Constitution
of the United States, as set forth in the 2nd Amendment
thereto, apply only to the congress of the United States
and not to the Legislatures of the several states. It would
seem then that we are only to consider the U. S. Constitution and the Laws oi the State of Utah applied to the control of guns and the limitations therein as set forth in the
Constitution of the State of Utah. We may consider
then, the Constitution of the United States in so far as
the control prescribed by Utah law violates the protection of the 14th Amendment as set forth in the Due
Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of that
Amendment. Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution of
the State of Utah reads as follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS. The people have
the right to bear arms for their security and defense, but the legislature may regulate the exercise of this right by law."
This provision setting forth the right of the people of
the State of Utah to bear arms differs from the comparable Federal Provisions and the provisions in the Constitutions of many of the other states in significant respects.
In the first place, the Utah Constitution does not limit
the bearing of arms to citizens as do the Constitutions
of some states, see Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S.
138, 34 S. Ct. 281, 58 L. Ed. 539 (1914). Further, Article
I, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution cited above does
not purport to give unlimited right to all persons to bear
arms and sets forth therein the limitation that the legislature may regulate this right. It remains then, only
to inquire as to whether the invoking of the provisions
of Utah Code Annotated 76-10-503, as to the Appellant
herein is violative of his rights to due process and equal
protection under the laws. It is well established that the
legislature may single out a class of person and place
special burdens on that class, provided that that class
manifests characteristics which, to a real and substantial
extent, distinguish that class from all other persons and
justify an imposition of the burden. It is also well established that the police power of the State is for the
purpose of protecting the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the people but, the legislature, acting under such power, must have such purpose in classification
of a group in imposing burdens on that group and withDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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holding the same burden from other classes. The distinction made by the legislature must be based on a real and
substantial difference of the classes, and such difference
must be relevant to the purpose which the legislation is
intended to achieve. The Appellant submits that he has
been lawfully admitted in the Country under Federal
law, and therefore he has a Federal privilege to enter
and abide in any state in the union and thereafter under
the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States to enjoy equal protection of the laws in any State
in which he abides. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 36
S. Ct., 60 L. Ed. 131 (1915), in the Truax decision, the
Court noted that it has on occasion sustained State
Legislation that did not apply equally to citizens and
noncitizens, the grounds for this distinction being that
such laws were necessary to protect a special interest
either of the State or the citizen of the State. A special
interest of the citizens of the State of California was
asserted in the case of Tahahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U. S. 410, 92 L. Ed. 1478, 68 S. Ct. 1138
(1948). In that case the Court held that under the
United States Constitution, the power is withheld from
the several states to determine what aliens should or
should not be admitted to the United States, the period
that aliens may remain in the United States, the regulation of alien conduct before naturalization and the terms
and conditions of alien naturalization. The Court then
held that the States can neither add nor take from the
conditions lawfully imposed by congress upon admission
to or naturalization and residence in the United States
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and in the several states. The Court went on to state
that the 14th Amendment and the law adopted under its
authority embody a policy that all persons lawfully in
this country may abide in any state with equality of
legal privilege to that of the citizens of the state of residence under nondiscriminatory laws. The Takahashi case
seems controlling in determining the Appellant's rights
under the laws of Utah. The Appellant does not, by
this argument, state that under no condition may any
alien be precluded from owning a fire arm or possessing
the same, but only argues that the fact that he is an alien
alone is not enough to impose this burden upon him. In
Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, as amended by Title III of the Gun Control
Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. § 1201, 1202 (1968), the Federal
Government set forth Federal Prohibitions on the possession of fire arms as to certain classes of persons.
Sec. 1202. The congress hereby finds and declares that the receipt, possession, or transportation of a firearm by felons, veterans who are
discharged under dishonorable conditions, mental incompetents, aliens who are illegally in the
country, and former citizens who have renounced
their citizenship constitutes —
(1) a burden on commerce or threat affecting the free flow of commerce,
(2) a threat to the safety of the President
of the United States and Vice President of the
United States,
(3) an impediment or a threat to the exercise of free speech and the free exercise of a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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religion guaranteed by the first amendment to
the constitution of the United States, and
(4) a threat to the continued and effective
operation of the Government of the United
States and of the government of each state guaranteed by article IV of the Constitution. Sec.
1202. (a) Any person who —
(1) has been convicted by a court of the
United States or of a state or any political subdivision thereof of a felony, or
(2) has been discharged from the Armed
Forces under dishonorable conditions, or
(3) has been adjudged by a court of the
United States or of a state or any political subdivision thereof of being mentally incompetent,
or
(4) having been a citizen of the United
States has renounced his citizenship, or
(5) being an alien is illegally or unlawfully in the United States, and who receives,
possesses, or transports in commerce, or affecting commerce, after the date of enactment of
this Act, any firearm shall be fined not more
than $10,000.00 or imprisoned for not more than
two years, or both . . .
It is noted that there are restrictions placed on certain classes of aliens based on special facts and circumstances just as there are restrictions placed on various
classes of citizens based on special facts and circumstances. Appellant submits that the Court, upon finding
that the legislature considered the group and found that
the group, as a whole or to a large extent, contained speDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cial characteristics by which the group might be reasonably precluded from possession of fire arms, then the
Court could conclude that legislation would entail a
reasonable and valid classification. It seems apparent
from the law itself, that the legislature of the State of
Utah has made no reasonable classification, there is no
more basis for prohibiting alien possession of a dangerous
weapon than precluding the possession of a fire arm by
any other person or group unless the Court is willing to
accept the proposition that persons from other nations
are inherently more lawless, that aliens are not subject
to the same laws of the State of Utah as are others, that
noncitizens are less controlled in their egress or ingress
or that in some significant respect aliens are less wholesome as a group than are citizens. The Appellant submits
that there is not reasonable basis for any of these conclusions and challenges the State to produce one piece
of evidence or case that so holds. Further the appellant
challenges the State to show one special interest that
could be claimed by the people of the State of Utah in
having noncitizens precluded from possession of any fire
arms within state borders that does not apply equally
to other classes. In support of the Appellant's view, attention is respectfully invited to recent United States
Supreme Court cases and sister state cases construing
the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment of
the United States constitution as applied to classification. In Purdy and Fitzpatrick v. State, 456 P. 2d 645,
79 California 77, (1969), the California Supreme Court
held that a state statute providing that:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"No contractor or subcontractor or agent or
representative thereof shall knowingly employ or
cause to or allow to be employed on public works
an alien . . ."
is violative of the 14th Amendment under the Due Process Clause of that amendment in that it "Encroaches
upon the congressional scheme for immigation and naturalization and interferes with provisions of The Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, 8 U. S. C. A. § 1011
(1952), it was further held that the Statute
"Offends the equal protection clause of the 14th
Amendment of the United States Constitution."
In support of this proposition the Court cited Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 13 S. Ct. 1016, 37
L. Ed. 905 (1893). In adopting this view the California
Court adopted the recent line of thinking in equal protection cases by the Supreme Court of the United States
and noted that the concept of equal protection of the
laws compels recognization of the proposition that persons similarly situated with respect to a legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment. The Court went
on to point out that in cases involving "Suspect Classification" as defined in Korematsu v. United States, 323
U. S. 214, 65 S. Ct. 193, 89 L. Ed. 194 (1944), or "Fundamental Interests" as defined in Harper v. Virginia Board
of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 86 S. Ct. 1079, 16 L. Ed. 2d
169 (1966). The United States Supreme Court has prescribed a strict standard for the review of a particular
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enactment under the Equal Protection Clause. Not only
must a classification reasonably relate to the purpose of
the law, F. S. Royster Guano Company v. Virginia, 253
U. S. 412, 40 S. Ct. 560, 64 L. Ed. 989 (1920), but also
the state must bear the burden of establishing that the
Classification constituted a necessary means of accomplishing the legitimate State interest, Loving v. Virginia,
383 U. S., 87 S. a . 1817, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010 (1967). According to 82 Harvard Law Review 1065 (1972), Developments in the Law, equal protection cases were discussed
as follows:
"In cases involving suspect classificaitions or
fundamental interest of those discriminated
against however the Court has adopted an attitude of vigorous scrutiny of the law."
One of the reasons for this vigorous scrutiny was enunciated in Purdy and Fitzpatrick v. State, supra, when
the Court said that
"Aliens, denied the right to vote, lack the most
basic means of defending themselves in the political process."
In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322,
22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969), the Court said:
"Absent compelling state interest, residency requirements classifying welfare applicants violates the equal protection clauses of the 14th
Amendment, in that it precludes the right of
indigents to travel from state to state."
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In the case of Dunn v. Blumstien, 405 U. S. 330, L. Ed.
2d 774, 92 S. Ct. 955 (1972), at page 345, the Court
discusses the State of Tennessee's contention that a durational residency statute is necessary to control the evils of
immigrant stuffing of ballot boxes. The Court pointed
out that the fallacy in such an argument is that:
"Durational residence law bars newly arrived
residents from the franchise along with non residents."
This is the evil of the Utah Statute as it is applied to
the Appellant. There is no distinction between deserving
aliens and undeserving aliens or any other standard independant of citizenship and therefore the classification
is invidious and suspect and the State of Utah has not
and cannot satisfy the requirements as enunciated in the
controlling dassificaftion cases; that being that the State
must bear the burden of justifying the classification. See
also Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68, 20 L. Ed. 2d 436,
88 S. Ct. 1509 (1969), another recent United States Supreme Court case, In Re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 37 L.
Ed. 2d, 91 S. Ct. 2851 (1973), the Supreme Court held
that citizenship may not be prescribed by a State as a
requirement for the practice of law. The Court recognized that the fact that a person is an alien alone does
not necessarily mean that he would be unqualified as a
practitioner of law.
POINT IV.
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TATED 76-10-503 AS APPLIED TO THE APPELLANT, IS VIOLATIVE OF APPELLANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH,
As stated in the case of Untermire v. State Tax Commission, 102 Utah 214,129 P. 2d 881 (1942), the Supreme
Court noted that Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution
of the State of Utah was substantially a summary of
the 5th and 14th Amendments of the Federal Constitution and the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court
are highly persuasive in the construction and application
of Article I, Section VII of the Utah State Constitution,
The Appellant therefore submits that, to a large extent,
what has been held violative of due process and equal
protection of the laws by the Supreme Court of the
United States is also adopted and approved by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. In the case of State
v. J. D. Walker and R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 323,
116 P. 2d 766 (1941), the Supreme Court said that where
some persons or transactions, excluding from operation
of the law are, to the subject matter of the law, indistinguishable from classes included in those operations
then the law is discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary and unconstitutional. If a reasonable basis to differentiate can be found, the law will be held constitutional. In Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 113 Utah 284,
194 P. 2d 464 (1948), the Utah Court said that in determining whether classifications made by the legislature
are unconstitutional, discrimination is the very essence
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of classificaition and is not objectionable unless founded
upon an unreasonable distinction. It would therefore
appear that the Appellant must show not only that there
has been a discrimination but that the discrimination is
based on citizenship alone and using the criteria of citizenship alone is an unreasonable distinction. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has not approached
this precise issue. It would, however, appear that Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, supra, has, and it
appears that the Utah Court might follow that case as
has its sister states. Classification on the basis of noncitizenship alone is just as odious as classification based
upon race, creed, or color. See Fugii v. State, 242 P. 2d
(1952) and Namba v. McCourt, 204 P. 2d 569 (1949). It
is interesting to note that these cases, the former issuing
out of California and the later issuing out of Oregon, rely
on Takahashi in overthrowing statutes in which it would
appear that the people of those states might have some
special interest land ownership. Assuming that land ownership is strictly a function of the state, the restrictions
placed on state legislation in that area should be less than
restrictions placed on state legislation affecting a person's
individual rights protected by United States and State
Constitutions. The Appellant submits that the whole reason for the conferred constitutional right to bear arms is
for one's self protection against tyranny of government
and neighbors. The Appellant submits that the legislature
of the State of Utah has passed a law which precludes
him, without a rational basis therefore, of enjoying the
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safety and security granted to other persons within this

state.
POINT V.
THE LAWS REGULATING ALIENS HAVING BEEN PREEMPTED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ARE THE SOLE AND
SEPARATE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES AND U. C. A. 7610-503 AMOUNTS TO AN INTERFERENCE
IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.
In the case of Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 456 P.
2d 645, 89 Cal. 77 (1969), the Calitfornit Supreme Court
held that a California statute providing that:
"No contractors or subcontractor or agent or
representative thereof shall knowingly employ
or cause to be employed on public work an alien
...

"Encroaches upon the congressional scheme for
immigration and naturalization . . . interferes
with . . . provisions of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act of 1952' as set forth in 8 U. S.
Code § 1011, et seq."
and further that the Statute:
"Offends the equal protection clause of the . . .
the 14th Amendment to the U, S. Constitution."
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In support of the ruling the California Court cited Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 13 S. Ot. 1016,
37 L. Ed. 905 (1893), and the United State Constitution,
Article I, § 8, Clause 4.
In the case of Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U. S. 410, 92 L. Ed. 1478, 68 S. Ot. 1138
(1948), the United States Supreme Court held that a
State,
"Can neither add nor take from the conditions
lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission,
naturalization and residence of aliens in the
United States or the several States."
In the case of Hines v. Dauidowitz, 312 U. S. 66, 61 S.
Ot. 399, 85 L. Ed. 581 (1941), the United States Supreme
Court held that a state law requiring registration of
aliens was unconstitutional in that it stood as:
"An obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of congress."
and further stated that,
"Experience has shown that International Controversy of the greatest moment, sometimes even
leading to war, may arise from real or imagined
wrongs to another subject inflicted or permitted
by a government."
As stated by the United States Supreme Court and
the Supreme Court of California in the above cited cases
under the authority granted in the U. S. Constitution,
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Article I, Section 8, the Congress of the U. S. has provided an elaborate scheme for the supervision of aliens
within this Country, including the Immigration and
Naturalization Act of 1952, supra. As previously noted
in the Argument on another issue, Congress has also seen
fit to regulate the possession of firearms by aliens, 7 U. S.
C. A. 1201, et seq. (1968). These sections provide that
an alien who is illegally or unlawfully within the United
States or any alien having been a citizen of the United
States and having renounced this citizenship shall not
possess certain prescribed groups of firearms. In so providing, it would seem clear that the congress of the United
States has completely preempted the several states in
the area of control of possession of firearms by aliens by
prescribing the exact limitations which apply to aliens
an dto which aliens these limitations apply. In Hines v.
Davidowitz, supra, the Court observed,
"Consequently the regulation of aliens is so intimately blended and intertwined with responsibilities of the national government that where
it acts, and the State also acts on the same subject, 'The act of congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the power of the State, though
enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it/ And where the Federal
Government, in the exercise of its superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete
scheme of regulation and has therein provided
a standard for registration of aliens, states cannot inconsistently with the purpose of congress,
conflict or interfere with, curtail or compliment,
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the Federal Law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations . . ."
An interesting case handed down by United States Supreme Court, that being Zschernig v. Miller, 389
U. S. 429,19 L. Ed. 2d 683, 88 S. Ct. 664 (1968), the Court
held that certain portions of the probate law of Oregon
encroach upon the province of congress in the area of
alien rights and stated that a statute conditioning inheritance by aliens on the alien's government redprocacation of right or the alien's government agreeing to reciprocate is invalid as
"An intrusion of the State into the field of foreign affairs . . . would make unavoidable judicial
crticism of nations established on a more authoritarian basis than the U. S."
The Supreme Court also held that the probate law of
Oregon was in conflict with the 1923 Treaty with Germany. And stated that,
"The Probate law of Oregon . . . affects international relations in a persistent, subtle way.
The practices of State Courts in withholding
remittances to legatees residing in Communist
countries or in preventing them from assigning
them is notorious."
The Court then cites Berman, Soviet Heirs in American
Courts, 62 Col. L. Rev. 257 (1962) and Chaitkin, The
Rights of Residents of Russia and its Satellites to Share
in Estates of American Decedents, 25 S. Cal. L. Rev. 297
(1952). The Court then went on to state that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
"The several states, of course, have traditionally
regulated the descent and distribution of estates, but those regulations must give way if
they impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy."
It seems clear to Appellant that if statutes governing
such traditional subjects of stat regulation as probate
law fall when they encroach on the area of foreign policy
then the cases above appear to leave no doubt that this
principle would also apply to the instant case and render
the Utah Statute invalid as it applies to aliens.
There are other statutory provisions of the United
States Code which apply to the instant situation and
which appear to preempt Utah's right to subject aliens
to special limitations. 42 U. S. Code § 1981, was originally enacted to protect the rights of negroes, but it has
been held in Roberto v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 177 F. 2d 811 (C. A. I l l ) , Cert. Den., 339 U. S.
929 (1949), that:
"Although enacted primarily to insure equal
civil rights of negroes, it has been held that the
protection of this section extends to aliens as
well as citizens.,,
This statute was also cited in Oyama v. California, 332
U. S. 633, 92 L. Ed. 249, 68 S. Ot. 269 (1948), the wording of the statute is:
"EQUAL RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW"
"All persons within the jurisdiction of the U. S.
shall have the same right in every state and
territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
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be parties, give evidence, and to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property as enjoyed
to white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses,
and exactions of every kind and to no other."
The Charter of United Nations, Departtment of State
Pub. 2368, pp. 1-20, which document both the U. S. and
Italy are signatory to, there are many provisions relating
to Human Rights Significant in this Area are:
ARTICLE 55
With a view to the creation of conditions of
stability and well being which are necessary for
peaceful and friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples, the United
Nations shall promote:
a. Higher Standard of Living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;
b. Solutions of international economic, social, health and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation;
and
c. Universal respect for, and observance of,
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language
or religion.
ARTICLE 56
All members pledge themselves to take joint and
separate action in cooperation with the organization for the achievement of the purposes set
forth in Article 55.
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In Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Resolution
217 A (111) Gen. Assy. (10 Dec. 1948) as set forth in
The United Nations and Human Rights, Infra.,
ARTICLE 2
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion,
National and Social origin, property, birth or
other status.
Although the declarations are not binding on the members of the United Nations, The United Nations and Human Rights, Infra, at P. 5, they represent the ideals and
goals of the nations signatory to the chapter.
In 1966, the Covenants on Human Relations, U. S.
Dept. of State Pub. 2368 (1945), pp. 1-20, were accepted
by the general assembly of the United Nations and it was
provided that they become binding upon the Nations
upon acceptance thereby. The United States Congress has
not seen fit to accept or reject the covenants and are
still, in fact, considering them. Utah purports to reject
the United Nations Chapter, Universal Dedarataon of
Human Rights and the Universal Covenaots on Human
Rights, This, Appellant maintains, the State of Utah
may not do in that it would and does encroach upon the
foreign relations of the United States which is reserved
to the Federal Government and further that the Utah
statute operates to reject the Covenants on Human Relations now before congress and subject to their ratificaDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tion. According to Eighteenth Report of the Commission
to Study the Organization of Peace, The United Nations
and Human Rights, Oceana Pub. 1968 at page 15, the
United States Senate has taken no formal action on these
covenants but that of the special conventions on Human
Rights drafted by the United Nation, five have been submitted to congress and one has been ratified as of 1968.
As stated in Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, the Foundation Press, Inc., (1972) at Page 155.
"For the United States parallel human rights
undertakings have obvious foreign relations purposes. In part she is concerned to maintain
leadership in international affairs by proving that
she deserves it, by her behavior at home and
her willingness to join in cooperative international efforts. In large part, she is concerned to
see that minimum standards observed in other
countries in order to safeguard her own standards, to promote conditions that are conducive
to American Prosperity and to American interests in international peace and security. Of
obvious, 'International Concern' to this country,
for example would be an international convention fixing high labor standard or outlawing slavery or forced labor. If it were adopted by the
nations with which the United States competes
to sell, manufacture goods in world markets.
Other human rights are also of authentic international concern for the United States, witness
apartheid in South Africa, events not long ago
in communist countries . . ."
"The United States, then does not adhere
to human rights covenants in order to distort
or circumvent our constitutional system, to legDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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islate greater human rights for its own citizens
by treaty rather than act of congress or to take
additional matters from States into Federal domain; she adheres to such covenants in order to
modify the behavior of other governments and
the ways it effect the American interest. To get
other nations to undertake to observe higher
standards and to give the United States the
right to request compliance with those standards, the United States is prepared to pay the
price of undertaking to apply similar standards
in the United States and to recognize other nations request American appliance."
This scholarly statement supports the holding in Zschernig v. Miller, supra. That the laws of Oregon effect international relations "in a persistent and subtle way"
and cannot stand if they impair the effect exercise of
of the Nation's foreign policy; the same is true of the
Laws of Utah.
CONCLUSION
Appellant submits that the Jury array was improperly assembled, that the verdict was not supported by
the evidence and that the Defendant was convicted under an unconstitutional statute and therefore the Judgment of the Lower Court should be reversed with instructions for the Lower Court to set aside the jury verdict and
dismiss the complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
A. W. LAURITZEN
Attorney for Appellant
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